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Abstract: We consider turn-based game arenas for which we investigate uniformity properties
of strategies. These properties involve bundles of plays, that arise from some semantical motive.
Typically, we can represent constraints on allowed strategies, such as being observation-based.
We propose a formal language to specify uniformity properties and demonstrate its relevance by
rephrasing various known problems from the literature. Note that the ability to correlate diﬀerent
plays cannot be achieved by any branching-time logic if not equipped with an additional modality,
so-called R in this contribution. We also study an automated procedure to synthesize strategies
subject to a uniformity property, which strictly extends existing results based on, say standard
temporal logics. We exhibit a generic solution for the synthesis problem provided the bundles of
plays rely on any binary relation deﬁnable by a ﬁnite state transducer. This solution yields a
non-elementary procedure.
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Stratégies uniformes
Résumé : Nous considérons des arènes de jeux pour lesquelles nous étudions des propriétés
d’uniformité des stratégies. Ces propriétés font intervenir des ensembles de parties, qui émer-
gent d’une quelconque motivation sémantique. Typiquement, nous pouvons représenter des con-
traintes sur les stratégies autorisées, comme par exemple être observationnelles. Nous proposons
un language formel pour spéciﬁer les propriétés d’uniformité et démontrons sa pertinence en re-
formulant divers problèmes connus de la littérature. Noter que la capacité à corréler diﬀérentes
parties ne peut être obtenue par aucune logique du temps arborescent à moins de l’équiper d’une
modalité supplémentaire, appelée R dans cette contribution. Nous étudions aussi une procé-
dure de synthèse automatique de stratégies soumises à une propriété d’uniformité, qui étend
strictement les résultats existants basés sur la logique temporelle standard. Nous proposons une
solution générique pour le problème de la synthèse dans le cas où les ensembles de parties sont
caractérisés par une relation binaire déﬁnissable par un transducteur ﬁni. Cette solution donne
une procédure non–élémentaire.
Mots-clés : théorie des jeux, logique temporelle, logique épistémique, stratégies uniformes
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1 Introduction
In extensive (ﬁnite or inﬁnite duration) games, the arena is represented as a graph whose vertices
denote positions of players and whose paths denote plays. In this context, a strategy of a player
is a mapping prescribing to this player which next position to select provided she has to make
a choice at this current point of the play. As mathematical objects, strategies can be seen as
inﬁnite trees those of which are obtained by pruning the inﬁnite unfolding of the arena according
to the selection prescribed by this strategy; outcomes of a strategy are therefore the branches of
the trees.
Strategies of players are not arbitrary in general, since players aim at achieving some objec-
tives: in classic game theory with ﬁnite-duration plays, the reasonable rationality assumption
leads players to play in such a way that they maximize their pay-oﬀ. More recently, (inﬁnite-
duration) game models have been intensively studied for their applications in computer science
[AG11] and logic [GTW02]. First, inﬁnite-duration games provide a natural abstraction of com-
puting systems’ non-terminating interaction [AHK02] (think of a communication protocol be-
tween a printer and its users, or control systems). Second, inﬁnite-duration games naturally
occur as a tool to handle logical systems for the speciﬁcation of non-terminating behaviors, such
as for the propositional µ-calculus [EJ91], leading to a powerful theory of automata, logics and
inﬁnite games [GTW02] and to the development of algorithms for the automatic veriﬁcation
(“model-checking”) and synthesis of hardware and software systems.
Additionally, the cross fertilization of multi-agent systems and distributed systems theories
has led to equip logical systems with additional modalities, such as epistemic ones, to capture
uncertainty [Sat77, Leh84, FHV91, PR85, LR86, HV89], and more recently, these logical systems
have been adapted to game models in order to reason about knowledge, time and strategies
[vdHW03, JH04, DEG10]. The whole picture then becomes intricate, mainly because time and
knowledge are essentially orthogonal, yielding a complex theoretical universe to reason about.
In order to understand to which extent knowledge and time are orthogonal, the angle of view
where strategies are inﬁnite trees is helpful: Time is about the vertical dimension of the trees as
it relates to the ordering of encountered positions along plays (branches) and to the branching
in the tree. On the contrary, Knowledge is about the horizontal dimension, as it relates plays
carrying, e.g., the same information.
As far as we know, this horizontal dimension, although extensively studied when interpreted
as knowledge or observation [AVW03, vdHW03, JH04, Ben05, PR05, CDHR06, AČC07, DEG10],
has not been addressed in its generality. In this paper, we aim at providing a uniﬁed setting
to handle it. We introduce the generic notion of uniformity properties and associated so-called
uniform strategies (those satisfying uniformity properties). Some notions of “uniform” strategies
have already been used, e.g., in the setting of strategic logics [VB01, Ben05, JH04] and in the
evaluation game of Dependence Logic [Vää07], which both fall into the general framework we
present here.
We have chosen to tell our story in a simple framework where games are described by two-
player turn-based arenas in which all information is put inside the positions, and not on the
edges. However, the entire theory can be adapted to more sophisticated models, e.g. with labels
on edges, multi-players, concurrent games, . . . Additionally, although uniformity properties can
be described in a set-theoretic framework, we have chosen to use a logical formalism which can
be exploited to address fundamental automated techniques such as the veriﬁcation of uniformity
properties and the synthesis of uniform strategies – arbitrary uniformity properties are in general
hopeless for automation. The formalism we use combines the Linear-time Temporal Logic LTL
[GPSS80] and a new modality R (for “for all related plays”), the semantics of which is given by
a binary relation between plays. Modality R generalizes the knowledge operator K of [HV89]
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for the epistemic relations of agents in Interpreted Systems. The semantic binary relations
between plays are very little constrained: they are not necessarily equivalences, to capture, e.g.
plausibility (pre)orders one ﬁnds in doxastic logic [Hin62], neither are they knowledge-based, to
capture particular strategies in games where epistemic aspects are irrelevant. Formulas of the
logic are interpreted over outcomes of a strategy. The R modality allows to universally quantify
over all plays that are in relation with the current play. Distinguishing between the universal
quantiﬁcation over all plays in the game and the universal quantiﬁcation over all the outcomes
in the strategy tree yields two kinds of uniform strategies: the fully-uniform strategies and the
strictly-uniform strategies.
As announced earlier, we illustrate the suitability of our notions by borrowing many frame-
works from the literature: strategies for games with imperfect information, games with opacity
conditions, the non-interference properties of computing systems, diagnosability of discrete-event
systems (with a proposal for a formal deﬁnition of prognosis), and ﬁnally the evaluation game
for Dependence Logic. Proofs of Section 3 are omitted due to lack of space, but they are quite
simple. Through these examples we show that both notions, strict uniformity and full unifor-
mity, are relevant and incomparable. These examples also demonstrate that deﬁning uniformity
properties with our formal language is convenient and intuitive. There are even more instances
of uniform strategies in the literature, but the numerous examples we give here are already
convincing enough to justify the relevance of the notion.
Next we turn to the automated synthesis of uniform strategies. For this purpose, we unsur-
prisingly restrict to ﬁnite arenas and to binary relations between plays that are ﬁnitely repre-
sentable: we use ﬁnite state transducers [Ber79], an adequate device to characterize a large class
of binary relations between sequences of symbols, hence they can be used to relate sequences of
positions, i.e. plays. Incidentally, all binary relations that are involved in the relevant literature
seem to follow this restriction. In this context, we address the problem of the existence of a
fully-uniform strategy: “given a ﬁnite arena, a ﬁnite state transducer describing a binary relation
between plays, and a formula expressing a uniformity property, does there exist a fully-uniform
strategy for Player 1?”. We prove that this problem is decidable by designing an algorithm.
This algorithm involves a non-trivial powerset construction from the arena and the ﬁnite state
transducer. This construction needs being iterated a number of times that matches the maxi-
mum number of nested R modalities in the formula specifying the uniformity property. As each
powerset construction is computed in exponential time, the overall procedure is non-elementary.
Regarding the decision problem for the existence of a strictly-uniform strategy, its decidability
is an open problem.
The paper is organized as follows. in Section 2 we set the mathematical framework: we intro-
duce the notion of uniform strategies and we present the formal language to specify uniformity
properties. Next, in Section 3, we expose a signiﬁcant set of six instances of uniform strategy
problems from the literature. Section 4 is dedicated to a short reminder about ﬁnite state trans-
ducers that are used in the strategy synthesis problem addressed and solved in Section 5. We
ﬁnish by a discussion on the work done and perspectives in Section 6.
2 Uniform properties
In this section we deﬁne a very general notion of uniform strategies. We consider two-player turn-
based games that are played on graphs with vertices labelled with propositions.These propositions
represent the relevant information for the uniformity properties one wants to state. If the game
models a dynamic system interacting with its environment, relevant information can be the value
Inria
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of some (Boolean) variables. If it models agents interacting in a network, interesting information
can be the state of the communication channels. In games with imperfect information, it can be
what action has just been played.
From now on and for the rest of the paper, we let AP be an inﬁnite set of atomic propositions.
An arena is a structure G = (V,E, vI , ℓ) where V = V1⊎V2 is the set of positions, partitioned
between positions of Player 1 (V1) and those of Player 2 (V2), E ⊆ (V1 × V2) ∪ (V2 × V1) is the
set of edges, vI ∈ V is the initial position and ℓ : V → P(AP ) is a valuation function, mapping
each position to the ﬁnite set of atomic propositions that hold in this position.
For v ∈ V , Tracesω(v) ⊆ vV ω is the set of inﬁnite traces starting in v, i.e. the set of inﬁnite
paths v0v1v2 . . . in the game graph (V,E), with v0 = v, and similarly Traces∗(v) ⊆ vV ∗ is the
set of ﬁnite traces starting in v, i.e. the set of ﬁnite paths v0v1 . . . vn in (V,E), with v0 = v and
n ≥ 0. We let Tracesω = ∪v∈V Tracesω(v) and Traces∗ = ∪v∈V Traces∗(v). Typical elements
of Tracesω are π, π′, and λ, λ′ are typical elements of Traces∗. Playsω denotes Tracesω(vI) and
Plays∗ denotes Traces∗(vI), respectively the set of inﬁnite and ﬁnite plays in the game. We
shall write ρ instead of λ to distinguish ﬁnite plays from other ﬁnite traces.
For an inﬁnite trace π = v0v1 . . . and i, j ∈ N, π[i] := vi, π[i,∞] := vivi+1 . . . ∈ Tracesω and
π[i, j] := vi . . . vj ∈ Traces∗. We will use similar notations for ﬁnite traces, and |.| : Traces∗ ∪
Tracesω → N ∪ {ω} denotes the length of the trace. If λ ∈ Traces∗, we let last(λ) := λ[|λ| − 1]
be the last position of λ.
A strategy for Player k, k ∈ {1, 2}, is a partial function σ : Plays∗ → V that assigns the next
position to choose in every situation in which it is Player k’s turn to play. In other words σ(ρ)
is deﬁned if last(ρ) ∈ Vk. Let σ be a strategy for Player k. We say that a play π ∈ Playsω is
induced by σ if for all i ≥ 0 such that π[i] ∈ V1, π[i+1] = σ(π[0, i]), and the outcome of σ, noted
Out(σ) ⊆ Playsω, is the set of all inﬁnite plays that are induced by σ.
We want to express properties of strategies that do not concern only single traces but rather
sets of correlated traces. We ﬁrst give a very abstract deﬁnition.
Definition 1 Let G be an arena. A uniformity property U ⊆ P(Playsω) is a set of sets of plays
in G.
Definition 2 Let G be an arena and U a uniformity property. A strategy σ is U -uniform if
Out(σ) ∈ U .
This deﬁnition gives an idea of the notion we want to capture, but ﬁrst this set-theoretic
deﬁnition is not very intuitive, and moreover it is so expressive that automatically handling this
notion in its generality is hopeless. We therefore restrict the notion of uniform strategy by ﬁxing
a formal language to specify uniformity properties. As demonstrated in the next section, the
language is powerful enough to capture plethora of instances from the literature.
The proposed language enables to express properties of the dynamics of plays, and resem-
bles the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [GPSS80]. However, while LTL formulas are evaluated
on individual plays (paths), we want here to express properties on “bundles” of plays. To this
aim, we equip arenas with a binary relation between ﬁnite plays, and we enrich the logic with
a modality R that quantiﬁes over related plays: the intended meaning of Rϕ is that ϕ holds in
every related play.
For the general presentation of the logic, we do not make yet assumptions concerning the
binary relation over plays, as opposed to Section 5 dedicated to decidability issues.
We now give the syntax and semantics of the language L.
RR n° 8144
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2.1 Syntax
The syntax of the language L is the following :
L : ϕ, ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | #ϕ | ϕ U ψ | Rϕ
where p is in AP . As usual we will use the following notations : true := p∨¬p, false := ¬true,
Fϕ := true U ϕ, Gϕ := ¬F¬ϕ, and ϕWψ := ϕ U ψ ∨Gϕ. In addition we will use the following
notation: 〈R〉ϕ := ¬R¬ϕ, and for a formula ϕ ∈ L, Sub(ϕ) denotes the set of all its subformulas.
The syntax of L is similar to that of linear temporal logic with knowledge [HV89]. However,
we use R instead of the usual knowledge operator K to emphasize that though it has a strong
epistemic ﬂavour, notably in various application instances we present here, it need not be inter-
preted in terms of knowledge in general, but merely as a way to state properties of bundles of
plays.
Definition 3 For a formula ϕ ∈ L, we deﬁne the R-depth of ϕ, denoted dR(ϕ), as the maximum
number of nested R modalities in ϕ. For n ≥ 0, let Ln = {ϕ ∈ L | dR(ϕ) = n} be the set of
formulas of R-depth n.
We note LTL the language Ln as it matches the syntax (and also the semantics) of the
Linear-time Temporal Logic of [GPSS80].
2.2 Semantics
To give the semantics of L we take an arena G = (V,E, vI , ℓ) and a relation ; ⊆ Plays∗×Plays∗.
A formula ϕ of L is evaluated at some point i ∈ N of a trace π ∈ Playsω, within a universe
Π ⊆ Playsω. The semantics is given by induction over formulas.
Π, π, i |= p if p ∈ ℓ(π[i])
Π, π, i |= ¬ϕ if Π, π, i 6|= ϕ
Π, π, i |= ϕ ∧ ψ if Π, π, i |= ϕ and Π, π, i |= ψ
Π, π, i |= #ϕ if Π, π, i+ 1 |= ϕ
Π, π, i |= ϕ U ψ if there is j ≥ i such that Π, π, j |= ψ and for all i ≤ k < j, Π, π, k |= ϕ
Π, π, i |= Rϕ if for all π′ ∈ Π, j ∈ N such that π[0, i] ; π′[0, j], Π, π′, j |= ϕ
The LTL part is classic. Rϕ is true at some point of a trace if ϕ is true in every related ﬁnite
trace in the universe.
We will sometimes need to evaluate an LTL-formula ϕ in a position v of an arena, with the
classic semantics that ϕ holds in v if it holds in every trace starting in v.
Formally, for an arena G = (V,E, vI , ℓ), a position v ∈ V and a formula ϕ ∈ LTL, we write
G, v |= ϕ if π, 0 |= ϕ for all π ∈ Tracesω(v)
Here we can omit Π because the formula has no R modality.
Definition 4 Given an arena G = (V,E, vI , l), a uniformity property is a pair (;, ϕ) where ;
is a relation over Plays∗ and ϕ ∈ L is a formula.
Now we deﬁne two notions of uniform strategies, which diﬀer only in the universe the R
modality quantiﬁes over: Out(σ) or Playsω (with the latter, related plays not induced by the
strategy also count). As we shall see in the examples of the next section, making a nuance is
worthwhile.
Inria
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Definition 5 Let G be an arena and (;, ϕ) be a uniformity property. A strategy σ for Player 1
is
• (;, ϕ)-strictly-uniform if for all π ∈ Out(σ), Out(σ), π, 0 |= ϕ.
• (;, ϕ)-fully-uniform if for all π ∈ Out(σ), Plays∗, π, 0 |= ϕ.
The notion of fully-uniform strategy is in a sense weaker than the strictly-uniform one. In-
deed, the fact that a particular play in an arena veriﬁes a formula ϕ in the fully-uniform se-
mantics, i.e. with Playsω and not Out(σ) as a universe, is independent of the strategy. Hence
in the general deﬁnition of uniform strategies, a uniformity property U could be deﬁned to be
a set of plays instead of a set of sets of plays, and a strategy σ could be said to be uniform if
Out(σ) ⊆ U instead of Out(σ) ∈ U , it would still contain the notion of fully-uniform strategies.
Strictly-uniform strategies could no longer ﬁt in this deﬁnition though, as deciding whether a
play veriﬁes a formula in this semantics cannot be done without knowing the strategy. In this
sense, strict uniformity is “stronger” than full uniformity. However, the notion of fully-uniform
strategies still enables to characterize tree languages that are not even µ-calculus deﬁnable: in-
deed, as observed by [AČZ06], given a inﬁnite tree, Property (*) that at every depth d > 0,
there exist two nodes, one of which being labeled by, say p, and one of which not being labeled
by p, cannot be ω-regular (a pumpimg lemma argument suﬃces). Hence this property cannot
be deﬁned by any µ-calculus formula. However, we are able to characterize arenas whose tree
unfolding has this property: consider the equivalence relation =length which relates plays with
equal length. One easily sees that the existence of a (=length,G(〈R〉p ∧ 〈R〉¬p))-fully-uniform
strategy is equivalent to say that the tree unfolding of the arena has Property (*).
Remark also that the relation ; plays no role in Deﬁnition 5 if ϕ does not contain any
R operator, hence it is a mere LTL formula. Notice that in this latter case, some standard
ω-regular (winning) conditions can be expressed over plays. The extension to a more powerful
logic, such as the full propositional µ-calculus, in order to capture all ω-regular properties is a
priori possible. However, for the examples considered in Section 3 this full power is not needed.
3 Frameworks from the literature
In this section we demonstrate that the notion of uniform strategy of previous Section 2 enables
to embed various problems from the literature, and in particular that it subsumes two existing
notions of uniform strategies.
3.1 Games with imperfect information
Games with imperfect information, in general, are games in which some of the players do not
know exactly what is the current position of the game. This can occur in real games, e.g. poker
since one does not know what cards her opponents have in hands, but also in situations arising
from computer science, like for example a program that observes or controls a system by means
of a sub-part of its variables, the interface, while other variables remain hidden. One important
aspect of imperfect-information games is that not every strategy is “playable”. Indeed, a player
who has imperfect information cannot follow a strategy in which diﬀerent moves are chosen for
situations that are indistinguishable to her. This is why strategies are required to choose moves
uniformly over observationally equivalent situations. This kind of strategies is sometimes called
uniform strategies in the community of strategic logics ([VB01, Ben05, JH04]), or observation-
based strategies in the community of computer-science oriented game theory ([CDHR06]).
RR n° 8144
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In games with imperfect information, the player’s ability to remember what happened so far
along a play is a key point to achieve a winning strategy, as opposed to e.g. perfect-information
parity games, where memoryless strategies are suﬃcient. Moreover in an imperfect information
conﬁguration, it is necessary to deﬁne what situations are indistinguishable to the player, and
this requires deﬁning how much memory she has of what occurs in a play. It is therefore relevant
under an imperfect information assumption to distinguish the perfect recall setting, as opposed to
the imperfect recall one. In the former, the player remembers the whole history of the observation
she had of a play, no matter how long it is, while in the latter the player forgets a part of the
information. An agent with imperfect information can either be memoryless, i.e. he does not
remember anything and takes his decisions only based on the current position, or have a bounded
memory, but this case can be reduced to the memoryless case by putting the diﬀerent possible
conﬁgurations of his memory in the positions of the arena.
While games with imperfect information and perfect recall have been studied intensively
[Rei84, CDHR06, BD08], the case of imperfect recall has received much less attention since
paradoxes concerning the interpretation of such games were raised [PR97]. Nonetheless, relevant
problems may be modeled with imperfect recall: typically, particular computing resources have
very limited memory and cannot remember arbitrarily long histories.
In this subsection, we show that the notion of “uniform” or “observation-based” strategy can
be easily embedded in our notion of uniform strategy, and this no matter the assumption made
on the memory of the player.
We ﬁrst consider two-player imperfect-information games as studied for example in [Rei84,
CDHR06, BD08]. In these games, Player 1 only partially observes the positions of the game,
such that some positions are indistinguishable to her, while Player 2 has perfect information
(the asymmetry is due to the focus being on the existence of strategies for Player 1). Arenas
are labelled directed graphs together with a ﬁnite set of actions Act, and in each round, if the
position is a node v, Player 1 chooses an available action a, and Player 2 chooses a next position
v′ reachable from v through an a-labelled edge.
We equivalently deﬁne this framework in a manner that ﬁts our setting by putting Player 1’s
actions inside the positions. We have two kinds of positions, of the form v and of the form (v, a).
In a position v, when she chooses an action a, Player 1 actually moves to position (v, a), then
Player 2 moves from (v, a) to some v′. So an imperfect-information game arena is a structure
Gimp = (G,∼) where G = (V,E, vI , ℓ) is a two-player game arena with positions in V1 of the
form v and positions in V2 of the form (v, a). For a position (v, a) ∈ V2, we note (v, a).act := a.
E ⊆ V1×V2 ∪V2×V1, vE(v′, a) implies v = v′, vI ∈ V1. We assume that p1 ∈ AP and for every
action a in Act„ pa ∈ AP . p1 holds in positions belonging to Player 1, and pa holds in positions
of Player 2 where the last action chosen by Player 1 is a: ℓ(v) = {p1} for v ∈ V1, ℓ(v, a) = {pa}
for (v, a) ∈ V2. Finally, ∼ ⊆ V 21 is an observational equivalence relation on positions, that
relates indistinguishable positions for Player 1. We deﬁne its extension to ﬁnite plays as the least
relation ≈ such that ρ ·v ≈ ρ′ ·v′ whenever ρ ≈ ρ′ and v ∼ v′, and ρ · (v, a) ≈ ρ′ · (v′, a′) whenever
ρ ≈ ρ′, v ∼ v′ and a = a′.
We add the classic requirement that the same actions must be available in indistinguishable
positions: for all v, v′ ∈ V1, if v ∼ v′ then vE(v, a) if, and only if, v′E(v′, a). In other words, if a
player has diﬀerent options, she can distinguish the positions.
Definition 6 A strategy σ for Player 1 is observation-based if for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ v(V2V1)∗, ρ ≈ ρ′
implies σ(ρ).act = σ(ρ′).act.
We deﬁne the formula
SameAct := G(p1 →
∨
a∈Act
R#pa)
Inria
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which expresses that whenever it is Player 1’s turn to play, there is an action a that is played in
all equivalent ﬁnite play.
Theorem 1 A strategy σ for Player 1 is observation-based if, and only if, it is (≈, SameAct)-
strictly-uniform.
Here we have to make use of the notion of strict uniformity, and not the full uniformity.
Indeed, after a ﬁnite play π[0, i] ending in V1, we want to enforce that the actions in the next
positions of equivalent plays are the same only in those plays that are induced by the strategy
we consider, and not in every possible play in the game. This would of course not hold as soon
as several choices are possible in π[i].
Also, it is interesting to see that this notion could also be embedded with a simpler formula
by using a relation that is not an equivalence. Deﬁne ; as: π[0, i] ; π′[0, j] if π[i] ∈ V1, j = i+1
and π[0, i] ≈ π′[0, i], and deﬁne the formula:
SameAct’ := G
∨
a∈Act
Rpa.
Then a strategy σ for Player 1 is observation-based if, and only if, it is (;, SameAct’)-strictly-
uniform.
In this version, the relation is not reﬂexive, in particular plays ending in V2 are linked to no
play, making Rϕ trivially true for any ϕ. This is the reason why we no longer need to mark
positions of V1 with the proposition p1 and test whether we are in V1 before we ask for some pa
to hold in every reachable position.
Finally, notice that to embed the case of imperfect-recall for example, one would just have to
replace ≈ with the appropriate relation.
3.2 Games with epistemic condition
Uniform strategies enable to express winning conditions that have epistemic features, the rele-
vance of which is exempliﬁed by the games with opacity condition studied in [MPB11]. In that
case, R can represent a players’ knowledge, or distributed knowledge between a group of players,
or common knowledge, depending on the winning condition one wants to deﬁne.
Games with opacity condition are based on two-player imperfect-information arenas with a
particular winning condition, called the opacity condition, which relies on the knowledge of the
player with imperfect information. In such games, some positions are “secret” as they reveal a
critical information that the imperfect-information player wants to know (in the epistemic sense).
More formally, assume that a proposition pS ∈ AP represents the secret. Let Ginf = (G,∼) be
an imperfect-information arena as described in Section 3.1, with a distinguished set of positions
S ⊆ V1 that denotes the secret. Let G = (V,E, vI , ℓ) be the arena with ℓ−1({pS}) = S (positions
labeled by pS are exactly positions v ∈ S). The opacity winning condition is as follows.
The knowledge or information set of Player 1 after a ﬁnite play is the set of positions that
she considers possible according to the observation she has: let ρ ∈ Plays∗ be a ﬁnite play with
last(ρ) ∈ V1. The knowledge or information set of Player 1 after ρ is I(ρ) := {last(ρ′) | ρ′ ∈
Plays∗, ρ ≈ ρ′}.
An inﬁnite play is winning for Player 1 if there exists a ﬁnite preﬁx ρ of this play whose
information set is contained in S, i.e. I(ρ) ⊆ S, otherwise Player 2 wins. Again, strategies for
Player 1 are required to be observation-based. It can easily be shown that:
Theorem 2 A strategy σ for Player 1 is winning if, and only if, σ is (≈,FRpS)-strictly-uniform.
A strategy σ for Player 2 is winning if, and only if, σ is (≈,G¬RpS)-fully-uniform.
RR n° 8144
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For the second statement of Theorem 2, we make use of the notion of full uniformity because
we are interested in the knowledge of Player 1. We consider that she does not know what
strategy Player 2 is playing, hence she may consider possible some plays that are observationally
equivalent to her but not induced by this strategy.
On the other hand, for the ﬁrst statement, we use strict uniformity but could have used full
uniformity instead. Indeed, since the actions chosen by Player 1 are part of what she observes,
she cannot consider possible a ﬁnite play that has not followed her strategy until the point i
considered. In fact, if π is induced by σ and π[0, i] ≈ π′[0, i], then π′[0, i] is also induced by σ.
The future of the play may not follow sigma, but this is not a problem here. Indeed, the property
that we consider on equivalent plays, pS, does not depend on the future.
Notice that though we chose to illustrate with an example, any winning condition that could
be expressed as a formula of the linear temporal logic with one knowledge operator would ﬁt in
our setting.
3.3 Non-interference
Non-interference, as introduced by [GM82], is a property evaluated on labelled transition systems
which handle Boolean variables. Such systems are tuples (S, I,O, δ, sI , Output) where S is the
set of states, I = H⊎L is a set of Boolean input variables partitioned into high security variables
H and low security variables L, O is the set of Boolean output variables, δ : S × 2I → S is the
transition function that maps each pair of state and input variables valuation1 to a next state,
sI is the initial state, and Output : S → 2O is the output function that represents a mapping of
states onto valuations of the Boolean output variables. We extend the transition function δ to
S × (2I)∗ → S as expected: δ(s, ǫ) = s and δ(s, ua) = δ(δ(s, u), a).
We deﬁne the L-equivalence, ∼L over (2I)∗ by u ∼L u′ whenever u and u′ have the same
length and they coincide on the values of the low security input variables, i.e. for all 1 ≤
i ≤ length(u), for all l ∈ L, l ∈ u(i) ⇔ l ∈ u′(i). Given an inﬁnite sequence of inputs
w ∈ (2I)ω , we abuse notation by writing Output(w) for the inﬁnite sequence of output variables
valuations encountered in the states along the execution of the system on input w. A system
(S, I,O, δ, sI , Output) veriﬁes the non-interference property if for any two ﬁnite sequences of
inputs w,w′ ∈ (2I)∗, w ≈L w′ implies Output(w) = Output(w′). In other words, the valuations
of high security variables have no consequence on the observation of the system.
A ﬁrst natural problem is to decide the non-interference property of a system. A second more
general problem is a control problem: we want to decide whether there is a way of restricting the
set of input valuations along the executions, or equivalently to control the environment, so that
the system is non-interfering. By constraining the applied restriction to be trivial, the former
problem is a particular case of the latter. We can encode the control problem in our setting.
Let Sys = (S, I,O, δ, sI , Output) be an instance of the problem, and write Σ for 2I with
typical elements a, b, . . . Without loss of generality, we can assume that Sys is complete: every
input valuation yields a transition. We deﬁne a two-player game arena that simulates the system,
in which Player 1 ﬁxes the environment, i.e. a subset of the possible inputs in the current state,
and Player 2 chooses a particular input among those. More formally, let GSys = (V,E, vI , ℓ),
with V = V1 ⊎V2, V1 = (Σ⊎{ǫ})×S and V2 = S× 2Σ. A position (a, s) ∈ V1 denotes a situation
where the system reaches state s by an a-transition, and (s, A) ∈ V2 denotes a situation where
in state s, the set of possible inputs is A. The set of edges E of the arena is the smallest set such
that (a, s)E(s, A) for all s ∈ S, a ∈ Σ and A ⊆ Σ, and (s, A)E(a, δ(s, a)) whenever s ∈ S and
1we classically confuse valuations over a set B of Boolean variables with elements of 2B .
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a ∈ A. The initial position of the arena is vI = (ǫ, sI), and by assuming that {po | o ∈ 2O} ⊆ AP ,
we set ℓ(a, s) = ℓ(s, A) = {pOutput(s)}.
By writing ι for the canonical projection from V1 ∪ V2 onto 2I (that is ι(ǫ, sI) = ι(s, A) = ǫ
and ι(a, s) = a) and by extending ι to ﬁnite plays as expected, we let ρ ≡L ρ′ hold whenever
ι(ρ) ∼L ι(ρ′).We now deﬁne the formula
SameOutput := G
∧
po∈AP
(po → Rpo)
which captures the property that the valuations of output variables along ≡L-equivalent execu-
tions of the system coincide, and we can establish the following.
Theorem 3 There is a one-to-one correspondence between (≡L, SameOutput)-strictly-uniform
strategies of Player 1 and the controllers which ensure the non-interference property of the system.
In particular, the trivial strategy of Player 1, where from any position (a, s) she chooses to
move to (s,Σ), is (≡L, SameOutput)-strictly-uniform if, and only if, the system has the non-
interference property.
Here we have to use the strict uniformity as we only want to consider the executions of the
machine allowed by the control represented by the strategy.
Notice that in order to make this control problem more realistic, one would seek a maximal
permissive strategy/controller so that environments as “large” as possible are computed, but this
is out of the scope of the paper.
3.4 Diagnosis and Prognosis
Diagnosis has been intensively studied, in particular by the discrete-event systems community
(see for example [SSL+95, YL02, CL99]). Informally, in this setting, a discrete-event system is
diagnosable if any occurrence of a faulty event during an execution is eventually detected. More
formally, diagnosability is a property of discrete-event systems which are structures of the form
Sys = (S,Σ,Σo,∆, sI , F ), with S the set of states, Σ the set of events, Σ0 ⊆ Σ the observable
events, ∆ ⊆ S × Σ × S the transition relation, sI the initial state and F ⊆ S the faulty states;
we assume that once a faulty state is reached, only faulty states can be reached (the fault is
persistent). We can rephrase this problem in our setting, with a single player simulating the
system. Notice that since there is only one player, a strategy deﬁnes a unique inﬁnite play.
Here we assume that pf ∈ AP represents the fact of being faulty. Let GSys = (V,E, vI , ℓ), with
V1 = ∅, V2 = (Σ⊎{ǫ})×S, (a, s)E(b, s′) whenever (s, b, s′) ∈ ∆, vI = (ǫ, sI), and ℓ(a, s) = {f} if
s ∈ F , ∅ otherwise. We write ρ ≡Σo ρ
′ whenever the sequences of observable events underlying
ρ and ρ′ are the same (these sequences are obtained from the sequences of positions in the play:
for each position of the form (a, s), keep its letter a if a ∈ Σo, and delete it otherwise). In
this game Player 1 never plays, all she does is look at Player 2 simulate the system. There is
only one strategy for her, which is to do nothing, and all possible plays, representing all possible
executions of Sys, are in the outcome of this strategy.
Theorem 4 Sys is diagnosable if, and only if, Player 1 has a (≡Σo ,Fpf → FRpf )-fully-uniform
strategy in GSys.
Here again, since the outcome of the only possible strategy for Player 1 is the whole set of
plays, we could equivalently choose full or strict uniformity.
Prognosis is a companion of diagnosis, but focuses on the ability to predict that a fault will
occur. Prognosability-like properties can be deﬁned in our setting. As an example, we aim at
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saying that a system is prognosable whenever the fact that a fault occurs in a system is known
at least one step in advance. We deﬁne the following formula, which means that either a fault
never occurs, or it occurs but we know it one step before it does.
Prognose := (¬pf )W(¬pf ∧R#pf ))
Using the same framework as for diagnosis, we can propose:
Definition 7 A system Sys is prognosable if there is a (≡Σo , Prognose)-fully-uniform strategy
for Player 1 in GSys.
3.5 Dependence Logic
Dependence Logic is a ﬂourishing topic introduced recently by Väänänen [Vää07]. It extends
ﬁrst order logic by adding atomic dependence formulas dep(t1, . . . , tn), which express functional
dependence of the term tn on the terms t1, . . . , tn−1. A dependence atom dep(x0, x1) can be
interpreted as "the value of x1 depends only on the value of x0", or "the value of x1 is fully
determined by the value of x0". Evaluating a dependence between terms on a single assignment
of the free variables is meaningless: in order to tell whether t depends on t′, one must vary the
values of t′ and see how the values of t are aﬀected. This is why a formula of Dependence Logic is
evaluated on a ﬁrst-order modelM and a set of assignments for the free variables, called a team.
If t is a term, M a model and s an assignment for the free variables in t, we note JtKMs ∈M the
interpretation of t in the model M with the assignment s.
Dependence Logic is inspired by Independence Friendly logic (IF logic), a logic deﬁned by
Hintikka and Sandu [HS89]. Van Benthem gives in [Ben05] an imperfect-information evaluation
game for IF logic, using a notion of uniform strategy that corresponds with the classic notion of
imperfect-information or observation-based strategy.
For Dependence Logic, an evaluation game is also given in [Vää07]. It is presented as a
game with imperfect information, because strategies must verify some “uniformity constraint”,
which makes the game undetermined. However, the notion of uniform strategy in these games
is not deﬁned as “playing uniformly in positions of an information set”, but rather as “playing
such that, when positions of an information set are reached, some property uniformly holds in
these positions”. For this reason it is a notion of uniform strategy diﬀerent from the one used by
Van Benthem in [VB01, Ben05], and this game is not a game with imperfect information stricto
sensu.
We present the evaluation game, the uniformity requirement and then show that this notion
ﬁts in our setting.
Let Φ be a sentence (formula with no free variable) of Dependence Logic in negation normal
form, i.e. only atomic formulas can be negated, and let M be a ﬁrst order model. GM(ϕ) is
a two player game between Player 1 and Player 2; positions are of the form (ϕ, n, s), where ϕ
is a subformula of Φ, n is the position in Φ of the ﬁrst symbol of ϕ and s is an assignment
whose domain contains the free variables of ϕ. The index n is used to decide, given two positions
containing the same dependence atom, whether they are the same syntactic subformulas of ϕ or
not. For a subformula ϕ, len(ϕ) is the number of symbols in ϕ. The game starts in position
(ϕ, 1, ∅) and the rules are as follows:
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position (t1 = t2, n, s): if Jt1KMs = Jt2K
M
s , Player 1 wins.
position (¬(t1 = t2), n, s): if Jt1KMs = Jt2K
M
s , Player 2 wins
position (Rt1 . . . tm, n, s): if JRKMJt1KMs . . . JtmK
M
s , Player 1 wins.
position (¬Rt1 . . . tm, n, s): if JRKMJt1KMs . . . JtmK
M
s , Player 2 wins.
position (dep(t1, . . . , tm), n, s): Player 1 wins.
position (¬dep(t1, . . . , tm), n, s): Player 2 wins.
position (ϕ ∨ ψ, n, s): Player 1 chooses between position (ϕ, n, s) and (ψ, n+ 1 + len(ϕ), s).
position (ϕ ∧ ψ, n, s): Player 2 chooses between position (ϕ, n, s) and (ψ, n+ 1 + len(ϕ), s).
position (∃xϕ, n, s): Player 1 chooses a value a ∈M and moves to (ϕ, n+ 2, s(x 7→ a))
position (∀xϕ, n, s): Player 2 chooses a value a ∈M and moves to (ϕ, n+ 2, s(x 7→ a))
∀x0∀x1ϕ′
∅
∀x1ϕ′
{x0 7→ 1}
∀x1ϕ′
{x0 7→ 0}
∀x1ϕ′
{x0 7→ 2}
x0 = x1 ∨ dep(x0, x1)
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 1}
x0 = x1
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 1}
dep(x0, x1)
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 1}
x0 = x1 ∨ dep(x0, x1)
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 0}
x0 = x1
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 0}
dep(x0, x1)
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 0}
x0 = x1 ∨ dep(x0, x1)
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 2}
x0 = x1
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 2}
dep(x0, x1)
{x0 7→ 0,
x1 7→ 2}
. . .
Figure 1: Evaluation game for ∀x0∀x1(x0 = x1 ∨ dep(x0, x1)) with M = {0, 1, 2}
Figure 1 represents (a part of) the game for the evaluation of the Dependence Logic formula
∀x0∀x1(x0 = x1 ∨ dep(x0, x1)) on a model M with domain M = {0, 1, 2}. This formula is not
true in this model. Indeed, intuitively, if there are at least three elements in the domain, it is
not because x0 and x1 do not have the same value that the value of x0 determines the value of
x1: there remain two possibilities for the value of x1 that are not the one of x0. So there should
not be a winning strategy for Player 1 for the evaluation game to be correct.
In the ﬁrst two rounds, Player 2 chooses a value for each of the universally quantiﬁed variables
x0 and x1. Then Player 1 chooses a disjunct and we reach atomic formulas. Green positions are
winning for Player 1, red ones are winning for Player 2. The red arrows indicate a strategy for
Player 1 (we focus on the subtree for x0 = 0, we assume that Player 1 plays the same way in the
others). We see that this strategy is winning for Player 1, while the formula is not true in the
model.
The problem comes from the fact that, as said earlier, a dependence atom must not be
evaluated on a single assignment but on a set of assignments, a team. In the evaluation game, the
team in which a dependence atom dep(t1, . . . , tn) should be evaluated is the set of assignments in
leafs that contain dep(t1, . . . , tn) and are reached by the strategy. In the example, the assignments
in the two leafs linked with the dashed line, {x0 7→ 0, x1 7→ 1} and {x0 7→ 0, x1 7→ 2} , are thus
part of the team in which dep(x0, x1) should be evaluated (there are more in the two other
subtrees not shown here). Then we see that this strategy should not be allowed as while both
leaves agree on the value of x0, they do not agree on the value of x1. This observation leads to
deﬁning a certain notion of uniform strategy.
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A strategy σ for Player 1 is uniform in the sense of [Vää07] if, for every two ﬁnite plays ρ, ρ′ ∈
Out(σ) such that last(ρ) = (dep(t1, . . . , tm), n, s, 1) and last(ρ′) = (dep(t1, . . . , tm), n, s′, 1) con-
tain the same (syntactically speaking) atomic dependence subformula, if s and s′ agree on
t1, . . . , tm−1, then they also agree on tm. Then we have the expected property that a sen-
tence ϕ of Dependence Logic is true in a model M if Player 1 has a winning uniform strategy
in GM(ϕ).
We characterize uniform strategies in the sense of [Vää07] as uniform strategies in our sense.
The game described above easily ﬁts in our setting (we add loops on terminal positions so as
to obtain inﬁnite plays). Let Φ be a sentence of Dependence Logic, and M be a ﬁnite model.
We call GMΦ = (V,E, vI) the evaluation game deﬁned above. For each object a ∈ M of the
domain we use one atomic proposition pa, and we also use the proposition pd to mark positions
that contain dependence atoms. So we assume that {pa | a ∈ M} ⊎ {pd} ⊂ AP , and we deﬁne
GMΦ = (V,E, vI , ℓ), where the valuation ℓ is as follows :
ℓ(dep(t1, . . . , tm), n, s) = {pa, pd} with a = JtmKMs
ℓ( _ , n, s) = ∅
We deﬁne the equivalence relation ≃ on ﬁnite plays as the smallest reﬂexive relation such
that if there is ϕ = dep(t1, . . . , tm) and n s.t last(ρ) = (ϕ, n, s), last(ρ′) = (ϕ, n, s′), and
JtiK
M
s = JtiK
M
s′ for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, then ρ ≃ ρ
′. Now we deﬁne the formula
AgreeOnLast := G(pd →
∨
a∈M
Rpa)
which expresses that whenever the current position contains a dependence atom dep(t1, . . . , tm),
it agrees with all equivalent ﬁnite plays on some value a for tm. Since equivalent plays are those
ending in a position that has the same dependence atom and agrees on the ﬁrst m− 1 terms, it
is easy to prove:
Theorem 5 A strategy σ for Player 1 in GMΦ is uniform if, and only if, it is (≃, AgreeOnLast)-
strictly-uniform in GMΦ .
In this example again, the strict uniformity is needed, as we only want to catch leaves that
are hit by the strategy. Also, note that here ≃ is an equivalence because we take the reﬂexive
closure of some transitive and reﬂexive relation. But as for observation based strategies, if we
did not take the reﬂexive closure, we could avoid using the proposition pd and use the simpler
formula
AgreeOnLast’ := G
∨
a∈M
Rpa
Indeed the relation would not be reﬂexive: in particular plays not ending in a dependence
atom would not be linked to any play, and Rϕ would trivially hold for any ϕ in these plays; this
is why testing whether we are in a dependence atom before enforcing that some pa must hold
everywhere would no longer be needed.
3.6 Dependence logic and games with imperfect information
As we said, the evaluation game for Dependence Logic presented in the previous subsection is
said to be a game with imperfect information. We do not agree, because the diﬀerence between
games with perfect information and games with imperfect information (at least in the perfect
recall setting, it is not as clear otherwise, see [PR97]) lies in the fact that in the latter, some
ﬁnite plays are related, in the sense that they are indistinguishable to one of the players, and
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this player must behave the same way in these related situations. Concerning the evaluation
game for Dependence Logic, the diﬀerence with perfect-information games is that some plays are
related, those ending in positions bound to the same atomic dependence formula dep(t1, . . . , tn)
with valuations agreeing on t1, . . . , tn−1, and the valuations in these related positions must agree
on tn. So it is not that players should behave the same way in related situations, but rather that
the players should have behaved in such a way that the valuations for tn are the same in related
situations.
But it is true that there is a similarity between these two constraints on allowed strategies,
as shown by looking at the formulas of the uniformity properties capturing observation-based
strategies (SameAct) and uniform strategies in the sense of Dependence Logic (AgreeOnLast):
SameAct = G(p1 →
∨
a∈Act
R#pa) and AgreeOnLast= G(pd →
∨
a∈M
Rpa)
In the ﬁrst case, the same thing must happen in equivalent situations, whereas in the second
case, the same thing must hold in equivalent situations.
The resemblance is even more striking if we take the second versions:
SameAct’ = G
∨
a∈Act
Rpa and AgreeOnLast’= G
∨
a∈M
Rpa
Neither semantics games for Dependence Logic are games with imperfect information in the
classical sense, nor games with imperfect information can be easily described using the uniform
strategy notion of [Vää07], but both can be characterized in a very similar way with our notion
of uniform strategies.
4 Regular relations
The previous examples from the literature all fall into a particular class of binary relations, so-
called regular2 relations. They are characterized by some ﬁnite state machines called transducers
[Ber79]. One way to see a transducer is to picture a nondeterministic automaton with two tapes,
an input tape and an output tape. The transducer reads an input ﬁnite word on its input
tape and writes out a ﬁnite word on its output tape. Notice that this machine is in general
nondeterministic so that it may have several outputs for a given input word. Hence, transducers
deﬁne binary relations.
Definition 8 A Finite State Transducer (FST) is a tuple T = (Q,Σ,Γ, qi, QF ,∆), where Q is a
ﬁnite set of states, Σ is the input alphabet, Γ is the output alphabet, qi ∈ Q is a distinguished
initial state, QF ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states, and ∆ ⊂ Q × (Σ ∪ {ǫ})× (Γ ∪ {ǫ})×Q is a
ﬁnite set of transitions.
Intuitively, (q, a, b, q′) ∈ ∆ means that the transducer can move from state q to state q′ by
reading a and writing b (both possibly ǫ). We also deﬁne the extended transition relation ∆∗,
which is the smallest relation such that:
• for all q ∈ Q, (q, ǫ, ǫ, q) ∈ ∆∗, and
• if (q, w, w′, q′) ∈ ∆∗ and (q′, a, b, q′′) ∈ ∆, then (q, w · a, w′ · b, q′′) ∈ ∆∗.
2Actually, the genuine vocabulary is “rational relations”, but we prefer to use “regular relations” to avoid any
misleading terminology in the context of game theory and rational players.
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In the following, for q, q′ ∈ Q, w ∈ Σ∗ and w′ ∈ Γ∗, notation q−[w/w′]→ q′ means (q, w, w′, q′) ∈
∆∗.
Definition 9 Let T = (Q,Σ,Γ, qi, QF ,∆) be an FST. The relation recognized by T is
[T ] := {(w,w′) | w ∈ Σ∗, w′ ∈ Γ∗, ∃q ∈ QF , qi −[w/w′]→ q}.
In other words, a couple (w,w′) is in the relation recognized by T if there is an accepting
execution of T that reads w and outputs w′.
Definition 10 Let Σ and Γ be two alphabets. A binary relation ; ⊆ Σ∗ × Γ∗ is regular if it is
recognized by an FST.
We now recall some basic properties of regular relations that will be useful later on. The
ﬁrst property regards intersection (regular relations are not closed under intersection in general)
and the second property regards composition. The interested reader is referred to [Ber79] for
technical details.
Property 6 Let Σ and Γ be two alphabets. Let ; ⊆ Σ∗ × Γ∗ be a regular relation, and let L
and L′ be two regular languages over Σ and Γ respectively. Then ; ∩ (L × L′) is also a regular
relation.
Let Σ,Σ′,Σ′′ be three alphabets. Let ;1 ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ′∗ and ;2 ⊆ Σ′∗ × Σ′′∗ be two binary
relations.
Definition 11 The composition of ;1 and ;2 is ;1 ◦ ;2⊆ Σ∗ × Σ′′∗, deﬁned by:
;1 ◦ ;2= {(ρ, ρ
′′) | ∃ρ′ ∈ Σ′∗, ρ ;1 ρ
′ and ρ′ ;2 ρ
′′}
Property 7 [EM65] If ;1 and ;2 are two regular relations recognized respectively by T1 and
T2 , then ;1 ◦ ;2 is also regular, and the composition of the transducers T1 ◦ T2 recognizes
;1 ◦ ;2.
We close this section by taking two examples of binary relations involved in Section 3 and
showing that they are regular. In fact, one can check that they all are.
Example 1 We ﬁrst consider an example induced by the imperfect-information setting of Sec-
tion 3.1. Let Gimp = (V,E, vI , ℓ,∼) be an imperfect-information game arena as described in
Section 3.1. Relation ≈ ⊆ Plays2∗ is an observational equivalence over plays, generated by the
equivalence ∼ between positions. Consider the FST Tobs depicted in Figure 2, with a unique
initial state (ingoing arrow) that is also the ﬁnal state (two concentric circles). It reads an input
letter (a position) and outputs any position that is ∼-equivalent to it. This FST recognizes a
relation ≃ over V ∗×V ∗, such that ≈ = ≃ ∩ Plays2∗. Because Plays∗ is a regular language (one
can see G as a ﬁnite state automaton), Proposition 6 gives that ≃ ∩ Plays2∗ is also a regular
relation, and in fact G × Tobs × G is a transducer that precisely recognizes ≈.
Example 2 Consider another binary relation that is also an equivalence, but induced by some
alphabetic morphism h : V → O ∪ {ǫ}: two plays ρ and ρ′ are equivalent, written ρ ≡O ρ′,
whenever h(ρ) = h(ρ′). This example generalizes the one of Section 3.4 where the alphabetic
morphism is a mere projection. In order to draw an FST for the relation ≡O, we need to ﬁx
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q0
{v/v′ | v ∼ v′}
{(v, a)/(v′, a) | v ∼ v′}
Figure 2: Tobs, an FST for the equivalence relation ≃ of Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
q0
qblue
qpink
{v/ǫ |h(v) = ǫ} ∪ {ǫ/v |h(v) = ǫ} ∪ {v/v′ |h(v) = h(v′) 6= ǫ}
{v/ǫ |h(v) = blue}
{v/ǫ |h(v) = ǫ} ∪ {ǫ/v |h(v) = ǫ}
{ǫ/v |h(v) = blue}
{v/ǫ |h(v) = pink}
{v/ǫ |h(v) = ǫ} ∪ {ǫ/v |h(v) = ǫ}
{ǫ/v |h(v) = pink}
Figure 3: TO, an FST for the equivalence relation ≡O.
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the set O. Assume O has only two elements blue and pink so that any position in the game is
either observed as h(v) = blue or h(v) = pink or unobserved (the case h(v) = ǫ). The FST TO
that recognizes ≡O is drawn in Figure 3. Once again, one should take the product of TO with
the game arena to restrict the relation to Plays∗ × Plays∗. Remark that contrary to the case of
equivalence ≈ in Figure 2, the equivalence ≡O does not preserve the length of plays.
Example 1 is an example of a simple transducer, but in fact all relations of Section 3 can
be recognized by the transducer given in Example 2, for an appropriate alphabetic morphism.
In the next section, we will only consider regular relations over plays, i.e. the relation ; in the
model is recognized by some FST.
5 Automated synthesis of fully-uniform strategies
In this section, we study the problem of synthesizing fully-uniform strategies. We restricy ﬁnite
arenas. Motivated by Section 4, we only consider regular relations, and as a consequence we
always assume that the semantic relation between plays is described by a ﬁnite state transducer
T . Still, when it is clear from the context, we write ; instead of [T ]. Also, because we only
consider full uniformity and no longer the strict one, it is understood in the semantics of a
formula that the universe Π is the set of plays of the considered game, hence we omit it when it
is clear from the context. Furthermore, we will sometimes make the semantic relation between
plays explicit. All these conventions yield a notation of the form π, i |=; ϕ meaning that
Playsω, π, i |= ϕ with the R-modality semantics based on the binary relation ;.
Finally, in this section, the size |G| of an arena G is the number of positions, the size |T | of a
transducer T is the number of states, and |ϕ| is the size of formula ϕ.
Definition 12 For each n ∈ N, we deﬁne the decision problem FUSn by:
FUSn := {(G, T, ϕ) | G is an arena and ([T ], ϕ) is a uniformity property3 with ϕ ∈ Ln such that
there exists a ([T ], ϕ)-fully-uniform strategy for Player 1 in G}
The fully-uniform strategy problem is FUS:=
⋃
n∈N FUSn
For an instance (G, T, ϕ) of FUS, its size is deﬁned as |(G, T, ϕ)| := |G|+ |T |+ |ϕ|.
Theorem 8 FUSn is in 2-EXPTIME for n ≤ 2, and in n-EXPTIME for n > 2.
Corollary 9 The fully-uniform strategy problem is decidable.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 8. We describe a powerset construc-
tion for a new arena (Section 5.1) and a way to lift the semantic relation between plays to this
powerset construction (Section 5.2). Next we show how to exploit this construction to reduce
membership in FUSn+1 to membership in FUSn (Section 5.3).
5.1 Powerset arena
In games with imperfect information, the information set of a player after a ﬁnite play is the
set of positions that are consistent with what she has observed. We deﬁne a similar notion in
our setting, and we show that the regularity assumption on the relation is suﬃcient to compute
information sets and build a powerset construction arena in which formulas of the kind Rϕ where
ϕ ∈ LTL can be evaluated positionally.
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Definition 13 Let G be an arena, ; ⊆ Plays2∗ and ρ ∈ Plays∗. The information set after the
ﬁnite play ρ is the set of terminating positions of related ﬁnite plays. Formally, I(ρ) = {v′ |
∃ρ′ · v′ ∈ Plays∗, ρ ; ρ′ · v′}.
For an arena G and a transducer T over Plays∗, we construct a powerset arena Ĝ in which
formulas of the form Rϕ can be evaluated positionally when ϕ ∈ L0.
Unlike classic powerset constructions [Rei84, CDHR06], in our setting, the new information
set after a move in the game cannot be computed knowing only the previous information set
and the new position. To compute information sets, we need to simulate the nondeterministic
execution of T , taking as an input the sequence of positions played and writing as output the
related plays. This is why in our construction, positions do not contain directly information sets,
but rather we add in the positions of the game suﬃcient information on the current conﬁguration
of the transducer.
More precisely, two things are necessary: the set of states the transducer may be in after
reading the sequence of positions played so far, plus for each of these states the set of possible
last positions written on the output tape (because of nondeterminacy, diﬀerent executions can
end up in conﬁgurations with same state but diﬀerent last letters on the output tape). We
only need to remember the last letter on the output tape, and not the whole tape, because the
information set which we aim at computing is just the set of the last positions of related plays.
So positions are of the form (v, S, Last), where S ⊆ Q is the set of possible current states
of T , and Last : S → P(V ) associates to a state q ∈ S the set of the possible last positions
on the output tape of T if the current state is q. The transitions in this arena follow the
ones in G, we just have to maintain the additional information about the conﬁguration of the
transducer. In order to deﬁne the initial position v̂I = (vI , SI , LastI) of Ĝ we need to simulate
the execution of T starting from its initial state and reading vI . To do so, we introduce an
artiﬁcial position v̂−1 that initializes the transducer before reading the ﬁrst position of a play.
Concretely, v̂−1 = (v−1, S−1, Last−1), with v−1 /∈ V a fresh position, S−1 = {qi} because before
starting the transducer is in its initial state, and Last−1(qi) = ∅ because nothing is written on
the output tape.
Definition 14 Let G = (V,E, vI , ℓ) be an arena and T = (Q, V, qi, QF ,∆) be an FST such that
[T ] ⊆ Plays2∗. We deﬁne the arena Ĝ = (V̂ , Ê, v̂I , ℓ̂) by:
• V̂ = V × P(Q)× (Q→ P(V )) ⊎ {v̂−1}
• (u, S, Last) →̂ (v, S′, Last′) if
– u = v−1 and v = vI , or u→ v,
– S′ = {q′ | ∃q ∈ S, ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, q −[v/λ′]→ q′} and
– Last′(q′) = {v′ | ∃q ∈ S, ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, q −[v/λ′ · v′]→ q′, or q −[v/ǫ]→ q′ and v′ ∈ Last(q)}
• v̂I is the only v̂ ∈ V̂ such that v̂−1 →̂ v̂.
• ℓ̂(v̂) = ℓ(v) if v̂ = (v, S, Last).
Notice that Ĝ has size |Ĝ| = O(|G| × 2|T | × 2|T ||G|).
Regarding the deﬁnition of transitions, the ﬁrst point means that transitions in Ê follow those
in E, except for the only transition leaving v̂−1, that is used to deﬁne v̂I . The second point for
the deﬁnition of S′ expresses that when we move from u to v in G, we give v as an input to the
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transducer. So the set of states the transducer can be in after this move is exactly the set of
states that can be reached from one of the previous possible states by reading v and writing some
sequence of positions (possibly ǫ). We use the notation λ because without loss of generality one
could assume that the transducer can only output sequences of positions that form a valid path
in the game graph. But it is not important here, the assumption that [T ] ⊆ Plays2∗ is suﬃcient.
Finally, the third point for the deﬁnition of Last′ captures that if some position v′ is at the end
of the output tape after the transducer read v and reached q′, it is either because while reading
v the last letter it wrote is v′, or it wrote nothing and v′ was already the end of the output tape
before reading v.
To ﬁnish with, v̂I is the only successor of v̂−1, and the valuation of a position in the powerset
construction is the valuation of the underlying position in the original arena.
Remark 1 We need to clarify the following deﬁnitions:
• S′ = {q′ | ∃q ∈ S, ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, q −[v/λ′]→ q′} and
• Last′(q′) = {v′ | ∃q ∈ S, ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, q −[v/λ′ · v′]→ q′, or q −[v/ǫ]→ q′ and v′ ∈ Last(q)}
Indeed, in each one, there can be inﬁnitely many such λ′ because of transitions that read nothing
on the input tape. Still, S′ and Last′ can be computed in linear time in the size of ∆. To do so,
for each q in S, we compute Sq,v = {(q′, v′) | ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, q −[v/λ′ · v′]→ q′, or q −[v/ǫ]→ q′ and v′ ∈
Last(q)}. S′ and Last′ can be easily reconstructed from ∪q∈SSq,v. For q ∈ S, computing Sq,v
can be done by depth-ﬁrst search, by ﬁrst reading v and then only ǫ, and remembering the last
output. The search can be stopped when we reach a state that has already been visited.
Let us take an arena G and an FST T such that [T ] ⊆ Plays2∗. For a position v̂ of Ĝ, we will
access the diﬀerent components of the position with the notations v̂.v, v̂.S, v̂.Last.
There is a natural mapping f : Playsω → P̂ laysω: for an inﬁnite play π ∈ G, we deﬁne f(π)
as the only play π̂ in P̂ laysω such that π̂[0].v · π̂[1].v · π̂[2].v . . . = π. This is well deﬁned because
from a position û = (u, S, Last) in V̂ , for v ∈ V such that u→ v, there is a unique move û →̂ v̂
such that v̂.v = v. It is easy to see that f is a bijection. From now on we will slightly abuse
notations: for a play π ∈ Playsω, π̂ will denote f(π), and for π̂ ∈ P̂ laysω, π will denote f−1(π̂).
idem for ﬁnite plays.
Definition 15 Let v̂ = (v, S, Last) ∈ V̂ be a position in the powerset construction. Its local
information set v̂.I is deﬁned by:
v̂.I :=
⋃
q∈S∩QF
Last(q)
Deﬁnition 15 means that a position v′ is in the information set after a play ρ̂ if and only if there
is an execution of the transducer on the word seen so far that terminates in an accepting state
with v′ the last output. Actually, the local information sets correspond to the real information
sets as expressed by the following proposition.
Proposition 10 For all ρ̂ ∈ P̂ lays∗, last(ρ̂).I = I(ρ).
The rest of this subsection is dedicated to the proof of Proposition 10.
Lemma 11 Let ρ̂ ∈ P̂ lays∗, and let v̂ := last(ρ̂). Then, v̂.S = {q | ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, qi −[ρ/λ′]→ q}, and
for each q ∈ v̂.S, v̂.Last(q) = {v′ | ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, qi −[ρ/λ′ · v′]→ q}.
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Proof The proof is by induction on ρ̂.
Case v̂I . We note v̂I = (vI , SI , LastI), and start with the left-right inclusions for both equalities.
Let q′ ∈ SI and v′ ∈ LastI(q). By deﬁnition of LastI and SI there is a q in S−1 = {qi}
(so q = qi) and a λ′ ∈ V ∗ such that qi −[vI/λ′]→ q′, which proves the ﬁrst inclusion. Since
Last−1(qi) = ∅ by deﬁnition, the case λ′ = ǫ is not possible. So there exists λ′′ such that
λ′ = λ′′ · v′, which gives us the second inclusion.
The proofs for the two right-left inclusions are straightforward applications of the deﬁnitions
of SI and LastI .
Case ρ̂ · û · v̂, ρ̂ ∈ P̂ lays∗ ∪ {ǫ}. We note û = (u, S, Last) and v̂ = (v, S′, Last′). For the two
left-right inclusions, let q′ ∈ S′ and v′ ∈ Last′(q′). By deﬁnition of S′ and Last′ there is a q
in S and a λ′1 ∈ V
∗ such that q−[v/λ′1]→ q′, and either λ′1 = λ
′ ·v′ for some λ′, or λ′1 = ǫ and
v′ ∈ Last(q). By induction hypothesis, we have that S = {q | ∃λ′ ∈ V ∗, qi−[ρ · u/λ′]→ q}, so
there exists λ′2 ∈ V
∗ such that qi −[ρ · u/λ′2]→ q, and by transitivity, qi −[ρ · u · v/λ′2 · λ′1]→ q′.
This proves the ﬁrst left-right inclusion. For the second one we split the two cases for λ′1.
• If λ′1 = λ
′
3 ·v
′ for some λ′3, then by transitivity we have qi−[ρ · u · v/λ′2 · λ′3 · v′]→ q
′, which
proves the second left-right inclusion.
• If λ′1 = ǫ, then v
′ ∈ Last(q). By induction hypothesis there is some λ′3 such that
qi −[ρ · u/λ′3 · v′]→ q. By transitivity we obtain qi −[ρ · u · v/λ′3 · v′]→ q′, which also proves
the second left-right inclusion.
Now for the ﬁrst right-left inclusion, take q′ and λ′ such that qi−[ρ · u · v/λ′]→ q′. Necessarily
there exist λ′1, λ
′
2 and q such that qi−[ρ · u/λ′1]→ q, q−[v/λ′2]→ q
′ and λ′1 ·λ
′
2 = λ
′. By induction
hypothesis q ∈ S, so by deﬁnition of S′, q′ ∈ S′. For the second right-left inclusion, take
q′ ∈ S′, and take v′ and λ′ such that qi −[ρ · u · v/λ′ · v′]→ q′. Again, necessarily there exist
λ′1, λ
′
2 and q such that qi −[ρ · u/λ′1]→ q, q −[v/λ′2]→ q
′ and λ′1 · λ
′
2 = λ
′ · v′. By induction
hypothesis q ∈ S. We distinguish two cases.
• If λ′2 = ǫ, then λ
′
1 = λ
′ · v′, hence qi −[ρ · u/λ′ · v′]→ q. By induction hypothesis,
v′ ∈ Last(q), so by deﬁnition of Last′, because q ∈ S and q −[v/ǫ]→ q′, we obtain
v′ ∈ Last′(q′).
• If λ′2 = λ
′
3 · v
′ for some λ′3, then by deﬁnition of Last
′, because q ∈ S, we have
v′ ∈ Last′(q′).
This ﬁnishes the induction.
We can now terminate the proof of Proposition 10: Let ρ̂ ∈ P̂ lays∗, and let v̂ = last(ρ̂)
be of the form v̂ = (v, S, Last). We remind that (Deﬁnition 13) I(ρ) = {v′ ∈ V | ∃ρ′ · v′ ∈
Plays∗, ρ ; ρ
′ · v′}.
We start with the left-right inclusion. Let v′ ∈ v̂.I. By deﬁnition, v̂.I =
⋃
q∈S∩QF
Last(q), so
v′ ∈ Last(q) for some q ∈ S ∩QF . By Lemma 11, there exists λ′ ∈ V ∗ such that qi−[ρ/λ′ · v′]→ q,
and because q ∈ QF , we have that (ρ, λ′ · v′) ∈ [T ], which implies that ρ ; λ′ · v′. Since
; ⊆ Plays2∗, λ
′ · v′ ∈ Plays∗, hence v′ ∈ I(ρ).
For the right-left inclusion, take v′ ∈ I(ρ). There exists ρ′ such that ρ′ · v′ ∈ Plays∗ and
ρ ; ρ′ · v′. By deﬁnition of T , there exists q ∈ QF such that qi −[ρ/ρ′ · v′]→ q. By Lemma 11,
q ∈ S, and v′ ∈ Last(q). Since q ∈ S ∩QF , v′ ∈ v̂.I.
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5.2 Lifting transducers
Let G be an arena, T an FST such that [T ] ⊆ Plays2∗, and let Ĝ = Power(G, T ). We describe
how to build a transducer T̂ that lifts [T ] ⊆ Plays∗ × Plays∗ to P̂ lays∗ × P̂ lays∗.
We note T↓ for the deterministic transducer that computes f , the bijection that maps a play
ρ̂ ∈ P̂ lays∗ to the underlying play ρ ∈ Plays∗, and T ↑ for the deterministic transducer that
computes f−1. Both are easily built from Ĝ, and |T↓ | = |T↑ | = O(|Ĝ|).
Definition 16 The lift of transducer T is T̂ = T↓ ◦T ◦ T↑.
Notice that |T̂ | = O(|Ĝ| × |T | × |Ĝ|).
In the following we let ; = [T ] and ;̂ = [T̂ ]. The following proposition follows directly
from the deﬁnitions of Ĝ and T̂ :
Proposition 12 For every ϕ ∈ L, π ∈ Playsω, i ≥ 0,
π, i |=; ϕ iﬀ π̂, i |=;̂ ϕ
5.3 R-elimination
We establish that given an instance of FUSn+1, we can build in exponential space and time an
equivalent instance of FUSn.
Proposition 13 For all instance (G, T, ϕ) of FUSn+1, there exists an instance (G′, T ′, ϕ′) of
FUSn computable in time exponential in |(G, T, ϕ)| such that:
• (G, T, ϕ) ∈ FUSn+1 iﬀ (G′, T ′, ϕ′) ∈ FUSn
• |G′| = O(2(|G|+|T |)
2
)
• |T ′| = O(2O(|G|+|T |)
2
)
• |ϕ′| = O(|ϕ|)
The rest of the section is dedicated to the proof of Proposition 13. Let (G, T, ϕ) be an instance
of FUSn+1.
Lemma 14 Let π ∈ Playsω, i ≥ 0, and ϕ be an LTL−formula.
π, i |=; Rϕ iﬀ G, u |= ϕ for all u ∈ I(π[0, i]).
Proof We start with the left-right implication. Suppose that π, i |= Rϕ holds, and take u ∈
I(π[0, i]). We need to prove that G, u |= ϕ. To do so, we take π′ ∈ Tracesω(u) an inﬁnite trace
starting in u and we prove that π′, 0 |= ϕ. Since u ∈ I(π[0, i]), by deﬁnition of the information
set, there exists ρ · u ∈ Plays∗ such that π[0, i] ; ρ · u. We let j = |ρ| and π′′ = ρ · π′ be such
that π′′[j] = u. Clearly, π′′ ∈ Playsω, and π[0, i] ; π[0, j]. Since π, i |= Rϕ holds, we have that
π′′, j |= ϕ. And because ϕ ∈ LTL, the fact that it holds at some point of a trace only depends
on the future of this point, hence π′′[j,∞], 0 |= ϕ, i.e. π′, 0 |= ϕ.
For the right-left implication, suppose that G, u |= ϕ for all u ∈ I(π[0, i]), and take π′ ∈
Playsω, j ≥ 0 such that π[0, i] ; π′[0, j]. We have that π′[j] ∈ I(π[0, i]), so G, π′[j] |= ϕ.
Because π′[j,∞] is in Tracesω(π′[j]), we have that π′[j,∞], 0 |= ϕ, hence π′, j |= ϕ.
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Lemma 15 Let π̂ ∈ P̂ laysω, i ≥ 0, and let ϕ be an LTL−formula.
π̂, i |=
;̂
Rϕ iﬀ G, u |= ϕ for all u ∈ π̂[i].I.
Proof Let π̂ ∈ P̂ laysω and i ≥ 0. By Proposition 12, for any ϕ ∈ LTL, π̂, i |=;̂ Rϕ iﬀ π, i |=;
Rϕ, and by Lemma 14, π, i |=; Rϕ iﬀ G, u |= ϕ for all u ∈ I(π[0, i]). Now, by Proposition 10,
π̂[i].I = I(π[0, i]), which concludes the proof.
We now deﬁne how formulas of the kind Rϕ can be replaced by new atomic propositions, and
how positions of the powerset arena can be marked with these new propositions: To an arena
G, a formula ϕ ∈ L and a subformula Rψ ∈ L1 ∩ Sub(ϕ) (if any), we associate a fresh atomic
proposition pRψ that occurs neither in G nor in ϕ.
Definition 17 For ϕ ∈ Ln+1, we deﬁne ϕ̂ := ϕ[pRψ/Rψ | Rψ ∈ L1 ∩ Sub(ϕ)].
Example 3 R̂#Rq = R#pRq
Definition 18 For an instance (G, T, ϕ) of FUSn+1, we deﬁne the instance ̂(G, T, ϕ) of FUSn
as (G′, T ′, ϕ′) by:
• If Ĝ = (V̂ , Ê, v̂I , ℓ̂), then G′ = (V̂ , Ê, v̂I , ℓ̂′), with
ℓ̂′(v̂) = ℓ̂(v̂) ∪ {pRψ | Rψ ∈ L1 ∩ Sub(ϕ) and ∀u ∈ v̂.I,G, u |= ψ}.
• T ′ = T̂
• ϕ′ = ϕ̂
From now on, for an instance (G, T, ϕ) of FUSn+1, we abuse notation by writing Ĝ =
(V̂ , Ê, v̂I , ℓ̂) for the modiﬁed powerset construction of Deﬁnition 18.
Lemma 16 Take an instance (G, T, ϕ) of FUSn+1, and let (Ĝ, T̂ , ϕ̂) = ̂(G, T, ϕ). Then for all
π ∈ Playsω and i ≥ 0,
π, i |=; ϕ iﬀ π̂, i |=;̂ ϕ̂
Proof By Proposition 12, π, i |=; ϕ iﬀ π̂, i |=;̂ ϕ, so it only remains to show that π̂, i |=;̂ ϕ
iﬀ π̂, i |=
;̂
ϕ̂. We prove it by induction on ϕ. The cases ϕ = p, ϕ = ¬ψ, ϕ = ψ∨ψ′, ϕ = #ψ, ϕ =
ψ U ψ′ are trivial. It remains to consider the case ϕ = Rψ, which decomposes into two subcases
depending on dR(ψ):
• If dR(ψ) > 0, then ϕ̂ = Rψ̂. We then have:
π̂, i |=
;̂
Rψ iﬀ ∀π̂′, j s.t. π̂[0, i] ;̂ π̂′[0, j], π̂′, j |=
;̂
ψ
iﬀ ∀π̂′, j s.t. π̂[0, i] ;̂ π̂′[0, j], π̂′, j |=
;̂
ψ̂ (by induction hypothesis)
iﬀ π̂, i |=
;̂
Rψ̂
• If dR(ψ) = 0, that is ψ ∈ LTL, then ϕ̂ = pRψ.
π̂, i |=
;̂
Rψ iﬀ G, u |= ψ for all u ∈ π̂[i].I (by Lemma 15)
iﬀ pRψ ∈ ℓ̂(π̂[i]) (by Deﬁnition 18)
iﬀ π̂, i |=
;̂
pRψ
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We can now achieve the proof of Proposition 13. Take an instance (G, T, ϕ) of FUSn+1. We
show that (Ĝ, T̂ , ϕ̂) = ̂(G, T, ϕ) is a good candidate. Notice that the natural bijection between
Plays∗ and P̂ lays∗ induces a bijection between strategies σ in G and strategies σ̂ in Ĝ, such that
for every strategy σ in G, if we note Ôut(σ) := {π̂ | π ∈ Out(σ)}, then Out(σ̂) = Ôut(σ).
Let σ be ([T ], ϕ)-fully-uniform in G. If π̂ ∈ Out(σ̂), then π̂ ∈ Ôut(σ), hence π ∈ Out(σ).
Because σ is ([T ], ϕ)-fully-uniform, π, 0 |=; ϕ. By Lemma 16 we conclude that π̂, 0 |=;̂ ϕ̂, which
means that σ̂ is ([T̂ ], ϕ̂)-fully-uniform in Ĝ. Since dR(ϕ̂) = dR(ϕ) − 1 = n, ̂(G, T, ϕ) ∈ FUSn.
Assume ̂(G, T, ϕ) ∈ FUSn, that is there exists a strategy σ̂ which is ([T̂ ], ϕ̂)-fully-uniform in Ĝ.
Any play π ∈ Out(σ) is uniquely associated to a play π̂ ∈ Ôut(σ) = Out(σ̂), which by assumption
satisﬁes π̂, 0 |=
;̂
ϕ̂. By Lemma 16, π, 0 |=; ϕ, which shows that σ is ([T ], ϕ)-fully-uniform in G.
This achieves the proof of the ﬁrst point of Proposition 13. For the second point, recall Def-
inition 14 that gives |Ĝ| = O(|G| × 2|T | × 2|T ||G|), so that |Ĝ| = O(2(|G|+|T |)
2
). The third point is
derived from this second point and Deﬁnition 16: |T̂ | = O(|Ĝ|× |T |× |Ĝ|) = O(2(|G|+|T |)
2
× |T |×
2(|G|+|T |)
2
) = O(2O(|G|+|T |)
2
). Finally, the fourth point stating that |ϕ̂| = O(|ϕ|) is immediate by
Deﬁnition 17.
It remains to prove that ̂(G, T, ϕ) is computed in time exponential in |(G, T, ϕ)|. Clearly,
the powerset construction (Section 5.1) and the lifting of the transducer (Section 5.2) both
take exponential time in |G|+ |T |, hence in |(G, T, ϕ)|. The marking phase in the R-elimination
(Deﬁnition 18) involves model checking at most |ϕ| LTL-formulas on each position of the original
arena G. Model checking an LTL-formula in a given position requires polynomial space in |G|+|ϕ|
[SC85]. Since PSPACE ⊆ EXPTIME, it is exponential in time. All in all, we need to model
check an LTL-formula at most |G| × |ϕ| times, so the whole marking phase is done in time
exponential in |(G, T, ϕ)|. We conclude that ̂(G, T, ϕ) can be computed in time exponential in
|(G, T, ϕ)|, which terminates the proof of Proposition 13.
5.4 Complexity of FUSn
In this subsection we describe an algorithm that decides whether an instance (G, T, ϕ) is in FUS,
and we establish upper bounds for the FUSn problem, for each n ∈ setn.
Algorithm 1 describes our decision procedure. It takes as an entry an instance (G, T, ϕ) of
FUS, and returns true if it is a positive instance4, false otherwise. To do so, starting from
(G0, T0, ϕ0) = (G, T, ϕ), it successively applies the construction described in Subsection 5.3 to
eliminate R operators in ϕ and to ultimately reduce the problem to solving an equivalent LTL
game.
It is known that solving LTL games has a time complexity doubly-exponential in the size
of the formula, and that it is actually 2EXPTIME-complete [PR89]. We remind that solving
an LTL game (G, ϕ), in the automata-theoretic formulation of this problem [Var91], can be
done by the following procedure, that we will call in LTLGameSolver (see [PR89, ALT04]).
First, compute a nondeterministic Büchi tree automaton that accepts trees whose branches all
verify the formula. This automaton is of size exponential in |ϕ|. Then, by for example Safra’s
construction [Saf88], build an equivalent deterministic Rabin automaton Aϕ with a number of
states doubly-exponential in ϕ, and a number of pairs exponential in ϕ. Then, with a linear
cost in |G|, transform the arena G into a nondeterministic tree automaton AG that accepts all
4i.e., there exists a ([T ], ϕ)-fully-uniform strategy in G.
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strategies of Player 1 in G. Then, there exists a strategy whose outcomes all satisfy ϕ if and
only if the product Rabin automaton Aϕ × AG accepts some tree. Deciding the emptiness of
a Rabin tree automaton can be done time O((ℓm)3m), where ℓ is the number of states and m
is the number of pairs of the Rabin automaton [Ros91]. Provided that for the product Rabin
automaton Aϕ ×AG we have ℓ = |G| × 22
|ϕ|
and m = 2|ϕ|, we ﬁnally obtain the following upper
bound:
Proposition 17 Solving an LTL game (G, ϕ) takes time |G|2
O(|ϕ|)
.
It is important to keep the size of the arena and the size of the formula apart for the moment,
instead of just saying that it is doubly-exponential in the size of the entry, because in our decision
procedure, the size of the iterated powerset constructions suﬀers a exponential blow-up, contrary
to the successive formulas whose sizes remains unchanged (and even decrease since subformulas
are replaced with atomic propositions).
Input: (G, T, ϕ)
Output: true if (G, T, ϕ) ∈ FUS, false otherwise
(G0, T0, ϕ0) := (G, T, ϕ);
k := 0;
while dR(ϕk) > 0 do
(Gk+1, Tk+1, ϕk+1) := ̂(Gk, Tk, ϕk);
k := k + 1;
end
return LTLGameSolver(Gk , ϕk)
Algorithm 1: Decision procedure for the problem FUS.
Theorem 8 as announced at the beginning of Section 5 can now be proved.
Let n ∈ N, and let (G, T, ϕ) be an instance of FUSn. If n = 0, the body of the while in-
struction is not executed, and we immediately call LTLGameSolver(G0, ϕ0). By Proposition 17,
this call takes time |G0|2
O(|ϕ0 |) , hence it is 2-EXPTIME in |(G, T, ϕ)|. We next answer the case
n > 0, and will distinguish the two particular cases n = 1 and n = 2.
For convenience, we introduce notations for iterated exponential functions: for k, n ∈ N,
expk(n) = 22
···2
n }
k.
Lemma 18 For every 0 ≤ k ≤ n, |Gk| = |Tk| = expk(O(|G| + |T |)2).
Proof By induction on k, using Proposition 13.
If (G, T, ϕ) is an instance of FUSn, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, by Proposition 13, the execution of the k-th
loop takes time exponential in |(Gk−1, Tk−1, ϕk−1)|. Hence by Lemma 18, the time complexity for
the k-th loop is exp1(expk−1(O(|G| + |T |)2) + |ϕ|) = 2|ϕ|expk(O(|G| + |T |)2), and the execution
of the whole while instruction takes time θwhile where:
θwhile =
n∑
k=1
2|ϕ|expk(O(|G| + |T |)2)
= 2|ϕ|expn(O(|G| + |T |)2)
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By Proposition 17 and Lemma 18, solving the ﬁnal LTL game (Gn, ϕn) takes time θltl,
where:
θltl = |Gn|
2O(|ϕn|)
= exp1(expn−1(O(|G| + |T |)2) ∗ 2O(|ϕ|))
We obtain that Algorithm 1 runs in time θ = θwhile + θltl, but since (for n > 0), θwhile
is negligible compared to θltl, we obtain:
θ = exp1(expn−1(O(|G| + |T |)2) ∗ 2O(|ϕ|)) (1)
Additionally, for n = 1, the double exponential complexity stems from the size of the formula.
For n = 2, because the size of the arena has taken two exponentials, the double exponential
complexity comes both from the size of the formula and the size of the arena. Afterwards,
since the arena keeps growing exponentially while the size of the formula remains the same, the
complexity comes essentially from the size of the arena. This achieves the proof of Theorem 8.
Note that the subroutine LTLGameSolver(Gn, ϕn) of Algorithm 1, based on the automata-
theoretic procedure of [PR89], does not merely decide the existence of a winning strategy, but
actually builds one (if any). Recall also that forgetful strategies are suﬃcient for LTL games,
as they are particular cases of regular games which enjoy the “Forgetful Determinacy” [Zei94].
By the natural bijection invoked in the proof of Proposition 13 between strategies in a powerset
arena and strategies in the original arena, one can trace the strategy in Gn back to a ([T0], ϕ0)-
fully-uniform strategy in the original game G0.
Corollary 19 Forgetful strategies are suﬃcient for full-uniformity properties.
6 Discussion
We have investigated the concept of uniform strategies in two-player turn-based inﬁnite-duration
games, motivated by the many instances from the literature: games with imperfect informa-
tion, games with epistemic condition, non-interference, diagnosis and prognosis, and Dependence
Logic. Uniformity is addressed in the context of a semantic binary relation between plays of the
arena, which can arise from any reason to relate plays with each others, e.g. an epistemic feature.
In order to embrace all the examples we have encountered, and likely many potential others,
we were led to designing a formal language whose sentences express the very uniformity properties
of strategies. Clearly, the language-based approach oﬀers intuitive deﬁnitions, while the set-
theoretic one, which may capture a larger class of uniformity properties, is much less readable.
The particular uniformity properties that have been addressed in the literature so far (Section 3)
can now more easily be compared. Our language is an enrichment of the Linear-time Temporal
logic LTL [GPSS80], hence it is interpreted over plays. The additional feature is captured by the
modality R which quantiﬁes universally over related plays. Whether this quantiﬁcation ranges
over all plays in the arena or just over outcomes of the considered strategy yields two variants
of uniform strategies, namely fully-uniform and strictly-uniform strategies.
The general procedure to decide the fully-uniform strategy problem is non-elementary. This
may be the price to pay for a generic solution for arbitrarily complex uniformity properties,
and we conjecture that the fully-uniform strategy problem is non-elementary hard. However,
bounding the R-depth of the formulas gives an elementary bound complexity, which seems inci-
dentally to be the case for all the examples of Section 3: only formulas whose R-depth is one are
needed, so that the generic procedure has “only” a double exponential time complexity. Notice
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that [MPB11] obtained a tighter (optimal) single exponential time bound for solving games with
opacity condition, which corresponds to the ﬁxed formula G¬RpS of R-depth equal to one and
to a simple ﬁxed binary relation between plays (see Section 3.2). Notice that if we ﬁx a formula
of R-depth 1, the time complexity Equation (1) of our procedure collapses to a single exponential
time complexity in the size of the arena and of the transducer.
Our results can be extended and commented in many respects. We give here some of them.
First, the choice we have made to rely on an enrichment of the LTL logic can be questioned
– although this logic regarding properties of time is acknowledged in many respects. We may
try to extend the synthesis procedure to a much richer logic like the Linear-time µ-calculus, a
language extending standard linear time temporal logic with ﬁx-point operators. But the current
procedure relies on a bottom-up traversal of the parse-tree of the formula ϕ, which cannot be
generalized to formulas with arbitrary ﬁx-points. The LTL logic falls into the very particular
so-called alternation-free fragment of the Linear-time µ-calculus, where ﬁx-points do not inter-
play. Signiﬁcant progress in understanding this extended setting need being pursued.
Second, we considered a single semantic binary relation between plays. One may wonder
whether the case of several relations ;i, yielding modalities Ri at the language level, can be
investigated at the algorithmic level. We foresee a generalization of our powerset construction
by synchronizing the execution of all the transducers of the relations. We however remain cau-
tious regarding the success of this approach since closely related topics such as the decentralized
diagnosis problem is known to be undecidable [ST02]. Still the question is important as it would
unify our setting with the Epistemic Temporal Logic ETL of [HV89] and bring light on the
automated veriﬁcation of ETL deﬁnable properties for open systems (see the module-checking
problem of [KV97]).
Additional comments are needed to fully understand the contribution, in particular regarding
the recent developments of alternating-time epistemic logic [vdHW03, JH04, DEG10]. The two
settings are close but incomparable. With the uniform strategy concept, we aim at extending
the range of (qualitative) properties of strategies by means of binary relations between plays,
and at exploiting those properties to synthesize particular strategies. Instead, alternating-time
epistemic logics oﬀer a way to quantify over strategies that achieve ETL-like properties, hence
they are not synthesis-oriented, and moreover, they do not handle arbitrary relations between
plays. Unifying the two settings is a real challenge; we would need to design a (necessarily more
complex) language that incorporates the speciﬁcation of the relation(s) between plays.
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